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At the nexus of neoliberalism, mass incarceration, and scientific racism: the conflation of 
blackness with risk in the 21st century 
 
Olivia C. Sailors 
Abstract: ​This paper examines how the systems of power of neoliberalism, scientific racism, and 
mass incarceration intersect to construct and uphold the image of “black criminality” and 
“blackness as a risk” to society. Risk assessments used to determine prison sentencing exemplify 
this phenomenon. Histories of deliberate associations between blackness and 
criminality--through science, media, political rhetoric, and economic systems--create a field in 
which risk assessment is widely regarded as a useful and scientifically neutral tool in mass 
incarceration. Particular scientific, economic, and carceral circumstances culminating in the 
21st century collude to elevate risk assessments into one aspect of a big data apparatus endowed 
with the capacity to predict and control future behaviors. The paper suggests future directions 
for scientific research to promote racial justice in the context of mass incarceration.  
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Introduction 
 Whether or not we realize it, humans are always making predictions. We use these 
predictions to influence our behavior and decisions. Afterwards, we reflect on ourselves and 
decide if our predictions led us to the outcomes we had hoped. If it doesn’t, we will probably 
change our predictions for a similar situation, so that we eventually get our desired outcome. As 
Cathy O’Neil explains, we are basically making our own models in our heads in to experience 
what we deem to be a successful outcome.​i​ However, the definition of a “successful outcome” 
differs from person to person. What happens when these flawed beliefs and priorities make their 
way into scientific and mathematical models? In the 21st century, these allegedly “impartial” 
models are shaping what the public believes to be “truth” and “reality”. 
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 The impartial models that I refer to in this essay are the algorithms used to create risk 
assessments. A risk assessment is something used to predict recidivism, which is generally 
defined as rearrest within two years after leaving prison. There are two main kinds of risk 
assessments, being clinical and actuarial. Clinical risk assessments have been around since the 
1930s, and so-called experts, such as psychologists and social workers, determined the risk of the 
person to public safety. Clinical assessments are still used today on occasion, but the majority of 
risk assessments are actuarial. Actuarial assessments allegedly were designed to make up for the 
flaws in human judgment, that were clear within the clinical assessments. Rathering than 
depending on a human to make the call about a person’s risk to society, they instead rely on a 
computer to take a series of steps to determine the risk of the potential offender. 
The most frequently talked about actuarial assessment are algorithmic assessments, where 
government entities and private companies develop an algorithm that is designed to assess the 
likelihood of recidivism. They generally include a questionnaire and static data that accounts for 
criminal history, level of education, family information, job status, etc., and puts more weight on 
certain factors than others, depending on the importance to the creators of the assessment.​ii  
 Algorithmic assessments are becoming increasingly appealing in among both 
conservatives and liberal circles. Since the 1990s, it has been playing a significant role in pretrial 
decision, sentencing, and parole, often in place of the older cash bail system. Many believe that 
the development of an algorithm “will lead to greater transparency and accountability”, being a 
clear improvement to the current cash bail system that disproportionately harms poor people.​iii 
Others in favor argue that as long as the assessment shows the human capacity to change our 
behaviors and improve ourselves, that it may be beneficial. ​In essence, better assessments help 
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determine where the proper intervention needs to happen to assist incarcerated people who are 
struggling to engage with and integrate into their communities positively.​iv​ Finally, conservatives 
are justifying their usage as a more efficient and lower cost solution to determine who should be 
incarcerated.​v 
Nonetheless, most of the public and scholarly discourse on risk assessments are 
explaining that risk assessments aren’t actually doing what they are intended to do. ​In a large 
meta-analysis including studies on male and female offenders and current and ex-felons, 
researchers found that a commonly used risk assessment called the Psychological Inventory of 
Criminal Thinking Styles (PICTS) has a low to low moderate correlation (.14-.25) in predicting 
recidivism between 6 and 24 months after incarceration, meaning that it’s not accurately 
predicting recidivism like it’s supposed to.​vi 
If they don’t show us the likelihood of recidivism, what do they show us? Recent findings 
from ProPublica demonstrates that one of the most common risk assessments, COMPAS, 
overestimated when black offenders would reoffend and underestimated when white offenders 
would reoffend.​vii​ This shows that the shift from clinical to actuarial assessments hasn’t 
eliminated human bias, but rather has shifted it to new areas of the assessment, being the 
questions asked, formulas created, and data collection processes.​ New literature on the bias 
within COMPAS and similar assessments is calling upon private companies to be more 
transparent with their algorithms. Formulas are becoming more public, but Northpointe (the 
company created COMPAS) is still concealing key features of the assessment, which will be 
explained in more detail later.​viii 
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If it’s widely known that risk assessments don’t actually predict recidivism, are racially 
biased, and as a result, reproduce the very structures they claim to dismantle, why are we 
becoming increasingly reliant on them in determining who goes to prison? This essay will 
explore the following questions; how did we get to our current time and place where risk 
assessments are considered a legitimate and useful tool for determining whether or not someone 
should be sent to prison? How, and what systems are interacting with one another to create a 
context where risk assessments are seen as a useful tool in sentencing? Lastly, what does our 
faith in risk assessments say about dominant American cultural values? 
 With this in mind, this essay is hardly about risk assessments at all, but rather examining 
modern axes of power intersecting, that being: neoliberal ideologies, racism (particularly 
anti-blackness), the legitimation of science as “objective”, and what these beliefs look like in the 
context of 21st century mass incarceration. In other words, I’m most interested in what risk 
assessments can show us more broadly about dominant American cultural values: the image of 
the “black criminal” has been constructed and reconstructed in different ways depending on 
historical, political, and economic contexts. Today, it is generally unacceptable to make explicit 
connections between blackness and criminality, so in an era that prioritizes science, technology, 
and neoliberal ideologies, one way to maintain this image of the "black criminal" is through an 
algorithm that predicts black people to be a "higher risk" to society through risk assessments. 
Through neoliberal ideologies and supposed “scientific objectivity”, risk assessments remove 
accountability on scientific and government institutions, both of which have a long history of 
anti-blackness. It's a way of producing the same racialized outcomes as if they are occurring by 
happenstance. Hence, risk assessments are a concrete example of how neoliberalism, scientific 
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racism, and mass incarceration are intersecting in the 21st century. What I hope to show here is 
that the nexus of these axes of power a new form of power is being constructed that is unique to 
the 21st century. It’s growing larger and stronger, and in many ways, is invisible. 
 With this in mind, I will be zooming in and zooming out throughout this essay, by 
examining risk assessments closely, and also zooming out on the power structures in place that 
have led to their creation, and legitimize them as a useful tool in incarceration. First, I will trace 
a history of key political, economic, and scientific events that constructed, reinforced, and 
reshaped the association between blackness and criminality. Next, in the section “Unpacking the 
risk assessment”, I will explain that one 21st century manifestation of the “black criminal” image 
is labeling black people as disproportionately “high risk” to society through risk assessments. 
Then, I argue that risk assessments are a part of a new 21st century big data obsession, that 
without our consent, is trying to understand current behaviors to predict in order to control and 
shape future behaviors. This is becoming increasingly dangerous, as it is bolstering the 
permanence of the carceral state. 
Defining key terms and considering relevance 
 In this essay, when I use the term “neoliberalism”, I am referring to specific aspects of 
the ideology, being a focus on individualism and individual accountability, the deregulation and 
removal of the government from personal affairs, the myth of meritocracy, and how these 
contribute to the exacerbation of inequalities. More specifically, 
“Under neo-liberal post-welfare policies, inequality is a result of 
individuals’ inadequacy, which is to be remedied not by increasing 
dependency through social welfare, but by requiring that 
individuals strive to become productive members of the workforce. 
Neo-liberal governments take less responsibility for the welfare of 
the individual; the individual becomes responsible for him or 
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herself. The goal for neo-liberal societies is to create a competitive, 
instrumentally rational individual who can compete in the 
marketplace.”​ix 
 
This mindset is highly problematic in the context of mass incarceration, as it places blame on 
individuals for inequalities rather than the social and governmental structures that have produced 
injustice. It reinforces the myth of meritocracy, that because the marketplace is “equally 
accessible to all,” people are receiving benefits and opportunities solely on the basis of their 
merit. 
Further, neoliberalism, especially in the context of big data, has led to increased 
surveillance of the public. With the initial benefits of the internet being so clear to politicians, 
and at a time where the government wanted to stay out of individual affairs, politicians embraced 
the internet as a decentralized space that was quickly innovating. However, its growth has 
become a part of a larger problem that Shoshana Zuboff calls “surveillance capitalism”. She 
explains that capitalism originated by taking items outside of the market, bringing them in, and 
commodifying them. She argues that we have entered a “new age of surveillance capitalism” 
where predictions about our behaviors are being brought into the market, are being bought and 
sold, in order to predict and control the future. This aspect of neoliberalism will be referred to as 
predictive analytics. 
Additionally, I utilize the work of Christina Sharpe to describe how I see “anti-blackness” 
operating in mass incarceration and scientific racism. She writes “the history of capital is 
inextricable from the history of Atlantic chattel slavery...What happens when instead of 
becoming enraged and shocked every time a Black person is killed in the United States, we 
recognize Black death as a predictable and constitutive aspect of this democracy? What will 
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happen then if instead of demanding justice we recognize...that the very notion of 
justice...produces and requires Black exclusion and death as normative?”​x​ What she explains 
here is that beginnings and foundations of the modern economy, which also shaped politics, 
social relations, and culture, was established through enslavement, and that these institutions rely 
on anti-blackness and racial inequalities to function like they were supposed to function. With 
Black death occurring through police brutality, and Black civil and social death happening 
through mass incarceration, it means these institutions have not been decolonized and are still 
anti-black at their core.​xi​ Finally, the term “scientific racism” refers to the manipulation of 
scientific processes with the goal of proving certain races to be inferior to others. Anti-blackness 
is also at the core of scientific racism, in that social scientists designed their data processes 
deliberately to maintain white beliefs about “black inferiority”, that were used to justify Black 
physical, civil, and social death, as I will explain in the following sections. 
 I hope to contribute to the current literature by adding risk assessments to parts of 
conversations about big data and risk assessments that are already occurring. However, in 
general, risk assessments are rarely historicized or contextualized in scholarly literature, and they 
often haven’t made their way into conversations about the power of big data, as those 
conversations are just beginning. By adding my analysis of risk assessments to current 
conversations, I hope it will be clear that the construction of risk assessments and their impact 
shows something much bigger than the risk assessment itself: that their legitimation has been in 
the process for centuries and that they are more dangerous than they seem on the surface. 
How did we get here? Constructing the “black criminal” 
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 My analysis on the association between blackness and criminality starts post-enslavement 
and at a time of major changes in social scientific research methods. After enslavement, white 
supremacists in power revised slave codes in the south in attempts of shaping the roles of black 
people to reflect what existed during enslavement. Known as black codes, laws were created to 
where a certain behavior was only considered “criminal” if that person was black, such as 
absence from work, breaching a job contract, or vagrancy.​xii​ Furthermore, they believed that 
there were certain crimes that black people were inherently prone to commit, such as larceny.​xiii 
These attempts at incarcerating, or essentially re-enslaving black people, led to 
disproportionately higher rates of black people in prisons. The real explanations for these high 
rates were suppressed of course, and white social scientists saw an opportunity to define black 
criminality through their own lens. 
 Simultaneously, major changes were happening in scientific research. Scientific research 
between the 12th century and the 19th century was a truth and illusion framework, where the 
researcher tried to discover universal truths, and anything else beyond the researcher’s findings 
were considered an “illusion”. In the 19th century, however, there was an epistemic shift when 
scientists started looking at findings as either objective or subjective, fundamentally changing the 
way research was carried out. The acknowledgement of the existence of subjectivity in research 
was important, but still, after operating for seven centuries under the assumption that universal 
truths were possible, 19th century scientists struggled to understand the line between objective 
and subjective experiences.​xiv​ In this context, scientists began to grapple with the extent to which 
research findings could be attributed to biological dispositions versus subjective experiences. 
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Sociologist Tukufu Zuberi builds upon this notion by discussing other changes that were 
happening in mathematics and science at the same time that supported white supremacist racial 
agendas. He explains that the creators of the field saw social statistics as a new way to 
conceptualize citizenship and individual value, worth, and rights.​xv​ Furthermore, “they believed 
that the confusion of politics could be replaced by an orderly reign of facts.”​xv​ In essence, the 
field of social statistics was created on the assumption that a person’s perception of their social 
world could become fact through mathematical methods. This would become a problem in the 
late 1890s, when white supremacists were still lashing out against the relatively newly gained 
freedom of black people in the United States. 
 Both this search for confirmation bias, a new need for objectivity, and the relatively 
recent introduction of social statistics as a field, set Frederick L. Hoffman up to publish his book 
Race Traits and Tendencies of the American ‘Negro’ ​in 1896, making it first major publication to 
attempt to construct “black criminality” as a scientific fact. He explained that black men and 
women were disproportionately incarcerated in nearly every charge due to inherent biological 
and cultural inadequacies of not respecting life, property, chastity, and general morality.​xvii​ He 
concludes that the race is actually going backwards as black schools and churches were actually 
preventing social progress, as black people teaching other black people could only lead to the 
spread of immoral values.​xviii​ Effectively, the research placed the blame on black people for their 
own “immorality” and “lack of social progress” since ended and reinforced ideas from other 
scientists supporting biological inferiority. ​Race Traits ​became the beginning of a range of 
scholarship aimed at maintaining the same racial hierarchies in the name of “objectivity.”​xix 
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 A closer look at Hoffman’s research methods shows a variety of flaws in his research 
methods that newly “objective” social scientists should have caught. W.E.B. Du Bois argued that 
Hoffman’s statistics showed more complex results than he claimed, and that he should have been 
recognizing the role of social factors such as wealth and poverty differences to understand high 
rates of black crime.​xx​ This is a significant contribution, as Hoffman and other social scientists 
also drew connections between whiteness and crime, and claimed that poverty was their main 
filter into prison. Given whites apparent decent schools, churches, and generally high morality, 
and that poor whites were more likely than wealthy whites to be in prison, the effects of poverty 
could be the only explanation for white crime.​xxi​ This demonstrates that Hoffman was fully 
aware of the power of social conditions on their likelihood of going to prison but chose to apply 
a different method to black people. Instead, he interpreted high crime rates in black communities 
as they appeared by the numbers, meaning the higher numbers in prison must imply a general 
lack of intelligence, immorality and tendency towards crime. 
Additionally, he legitimized “facts” that he couldn’t confirm even existed by accepting 
all “expert” testimony without questioning it. For example, as a part of his larger “black 
inferiority” argument, he supported claims from physicians who claimed they were providing 
equal healthcare treatment to black and white people. Plus, it’s clear that his definition of an 
“expert” was limited to white supremacists. For instance, prior to writing ​Race Traits, ​black 
scholar Ida B. Wells wrote ​Southern Horrors: lynch laws and all its phases ​which countered 
many of the arguments Hoffman would later make about alleged “black criminality”. Her work 
caused a lot of controversy at the time, and it’s unlikely that he didn’t know of it, and more 
probable that he chose not to include her perspective.​xxii​ Despite the clear lack of objectivity and 
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flaws in his data collection processes and conclusions, all renowned social scientists of the time 
were willing to agree that he was an exceptional statistician who had presented an incredibly 
thorough study on black people.​xxiii​ His methods were validated as objective by others in his field 
when they confirmed the findings that white supremacists were hoping for. 
 Around the same time, Francis Galton (founder of the term “eugenics”) would continue 
with this work by intentionally misapplying biological research methods in the social sciences to 
spread eugenics and engage in racial reification. The methods and analysis that he chose to build 
off of were already inaccurate, as they came from Charles Darwin’s racialized conclusions about 
evolution. Nonetheless, all of Darwin’s claims were widely accepted, creating space for Galton 
to utilize Darwin’s conclusions in social statistics.​xxiv​ There are many issues here, but among the 
main ones is that when we start with a flawed data set, but the conclusions are accepted anyway, 
other statisticians and scientists often utilize the same processes, providing more and more 
evidence for the same flawed claim. 
 Hopefully, at this point, I have proven that social statisticians who allegedly confirmed 
existing studies about the “truth” of “black inferiority” are the ones being published and 
believed. To prove my point further, black scholar William Hannibal Thomas published ​The 
American ‘Negro’: What He Was, What He Is, and What He May Become ​several years later, 
upholding many of Hoffman’s arguments. He explained that black people are intrinsically 
inferior, mentally retarded, and have a “record of lawless existence”. Further yet, his research 
methods included 25 years of observation and a dismissal of more standardized research 
methods, as he believed they couldn’t measure the criminal “instinct” of black people. His 
rejection of a more standardized research method should have been enough for social scientists 
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to dismiss his findings. Still, the third president of the American Sociological Association 
praised his work by saying it was the most detailed account on black people to ever have been 
published.​xxv​ This furthers my point that it was not detailed and accurate research methods that 
were defining truth and objectivity, but rather scholars that upheld dominant views on “black 
criminality” were the ones being legitimized and published. Dominant ideologies became even 
more permanent when they were labeled as objective by people believed to be experts, 
effectively deterring any attempts for the general public to argue against the faulty conclusions. 
Conversations about the associations between blackness and criminality were happening 
outside of academic spheres, too. Hoffman’s study found its way into the public sphere in an 
article from the New York Times that also praised his work, and Galton’s studies were widely 
accepted in their time as well.​xxvi​ Studies like Hoffman’s, Thomas’s, Galton’s and many others 
played a significant role in popularizing beliefs about “black criminality” that eventually 
culminated into the popular film of the time ​Birth of a Nation, ​about a black man who tries to 
rape a white woman, appealing to and reinforcing anxieties among white people about the 
“criminal nature” of black people, especially black men. It would later be cited by many scholars 
as a foundational event of the 20th century that set a precedent for widespread beliefs of “black 
criminality.”​xxvii 
20th century policies and rhetoric linking blackness and criminality 
My research indicates that while the 20th century had several significant instances of 
scientific racism (i.e. the Tuskegee Study and sterilization of black women to name a few), the 
link between blackness and criminality specifically wasn’t at the center of conversations in 
scientific journals. However, Hoffman’s, Thomas’s, and other similar studies from the late 1800s 
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and early 1900s had set the precedent and justification for “black criminality” as a biological 
reality. The image of the “black criminal” became further marginalized in the later half of the 
20th century, starting with a series of policies from the Johnson administration onward that 
reinforced this image. Importantly, during this time, politicians began tying blackness, 
criminality, and neoliberalism together in a way that would expand the role of mass incarceration 
as a tool to further marginalize black communities. In other words, science provided the 
justification for “black criminality” and politicians utilized these studies and rhetoric to 
implement the carceral state as we know it today. 
Fast forward to the civil rights movement and the Johnson era in American politics. 
Crime was rising at the time that the civil rights movement was gaining momentum. No one 
actually knew what to attribute the rise in crime to at the time, but opposition to the civil rights 
for communities of color quickly constructed it as the civil rights movement as the reason for 
the rise in crime.​xxviii​ At the same time, Democrats and race liberals were being accused by 
conservatives for not being tough enough on crime, putting Johnson in a situation where he felt 
the need to neutralize conservatives but also continue pushing for civil rights like he wanted. As 
a result, he created and implemented the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
appealing to conservative “tough on crime” rhetoric and liberal beliefs that federalizing and 
modernizing the criminal justice system would decrease violence aimed at racial minorities.​xxix 
The goal of the bill was federalizing the criminal justice system, and it did just that, but it also 
had the unintended consequences of expanding the roles of the police and numbers of prisons, 
that would end up hurting racial minorities the most. 
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During the Johnson era, we started to hear some of the main rhetoric that we will also 
hear in the Reagan era and today that contribute to criminalizing black communities, not only 
because of beliefs of black criminality, but through rhetoric of individual accountability, that 
would hurt poor, racialized communities the most. While some were attributing the nature of 
rising crime to the civil rights movement, many were also attributing it to the “negative 
consequences” that Johnson’s Great Society had on white people. Working-class whites began 
construing the Great Society (otherwise known as Johnson’s war on poverty) as something that 
benefitted these so-called criminals, by supporting their “bad parenting” and “increasing 
dependence on welfare”. Evidently, working-class whites were hoping be uplifted from poverty 
themselves and knew they couldn’t easily obtain that without necessary social services, but 
simultaneously were blaming black people for being impoverished. Essentially, this was an era 
where white people (even working-class whites) were blaming poor black people for being poor, 
and utilized antiblackness to justify why their economic circumstances should be changing, but 
black communities shouldn’t be receiving the same social benefits.​xxx​ This is one of the first 
major instances in which we will see the weaving of blackness, criminality, and rhetoric of 
individual accountability playing a role in the justification of locking up black people in 
disproportionate numbers. 
 Following Johnson, the Nixon administration utilized the idea of the “black criminal” to 
win the election. Nixon’s campaign strategy, known as the Southern Strategy, utilized coded 
race-based appeals and rhetoric of black “overdependence” on welfare to attract Southern and 
working-class white voters. In essence, they appealed to their fears of losing their privileges and 
economic opportunities as new groups gained their rights.​xxxi​ In particular, Nixon created what 
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Reagan would later extend; rhetoric of the need for “law and order”, by constructing black 
people as drug users and dealers, with the intention of suppressing any progress towards racial 
equality. We can confirm that these are intentional racialized appeals from this quote by one of 
Nixon’s advisors, John Ehrlichman: 
“The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House 
after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. 
You understand what I’m saying? We knew we couldn’t make 
it illegal to be either against the war or black...but by getting the 
public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with 
heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt 
those communities...We could arrest their leaders, raid their 
homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after 
night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about 
the drugs? Of course we did.”​xxxii 
  
These race-based appeals were the center of his campaign and were effective in the sense that 
they helped him win the presidency. Additionally, the Nixon administration was successful in 
maintaining a powerful opposition to the civil rights movement, even after the movement had 
largely ended, setting up the Reagan administration to later capitalize on this white backlash. 
 The next major administration to have a powerful role in conflating blackness with 
criminality was the Reagan administration. Ford and Carter had been in office between Nixon 
and Reagan, so to an extent, there was a pause on conversations of blackness and criminality, 
although the beliefs among the white public clearly remained and were simply reignited under 
Reagan. Reagan, in many ways, also marks the beginning of the neoliberal era in the United 
States. Reagan became president during a time that he claimed to be the worst economic crisis 
since the Great Depression, giving him the opportunity to infuse his ideologies with public 
support for economic change.​xxxiii​ Responding to concerns about welfare state that started during 
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the Johnson era (and returned during the Reagan era), Reagan attempted to improve the economy 
by slashing public services (such as welfare, healthcare and education budgets) and cutting taxes 
on the rich. By deregulating the market, and removing the government from personal affairs, he 
argued that the money would “trickle down” into investments in social services from the rich. 
 However, these economic goals had larger goals in mind. Essential to the neoliberal 
philosophy that a society should run like a marketplace, decentralizing the government in a 
society where inequality was rampant left too much room for the rich to capitalize on easily 
accessible opportunities for them and created more challenges for those with few opportunities in 
front of them in the first place. His campaign strategist, Lee Atwater, perfectly encompasses how 
he weaved his ideological objectives with his economic objectives. Atwater explains that they 
reapplied many of the ideas from Nixon’s Southern Strategy: 
“you start out in 1954 by saying “n*****”, “n*****”, “n*****”, 
by 1968 you can’t say “n*****”, that hurts you. It backfires. So 
you say stuff like forced-bussing, state’s rights and all that stuff. 
You’re getting so abstract now. You’re talking about cutting taxes. 
And of these things that you’re talking about are totally economic 
things, and the by-product of them is blacks get hurt worse than 
whites.”​xxxiv  
This points to the intentionality of the Reagan administration to utilize economic strategies as a 
way to promote an anti-black agenda. As Atwater points out, black communities are being 
harmed more than whites at this time, and one of those reasons is due to the establishment of 
privatized prisons. For-profit prisons could be justified as a solution to economic woes, but 
mostly through Reagan’s construction of the war on drugs. 
On the war on drugs front, frequent images on television of black men being handcuffed 
for selling or doing drugs, influenced sentencing for drug charges. With powder cocaine being 
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seen as the drug used by Wall Street bankers, and crack cocaine as the form of cocaine used by 
black men, politicians garnered enough public support to create a 1:100 disparity between the 
criminalization of powder to crack cocaine, leading to numbers in prisons skyrocketing, and 
particularly, numbers of black men.​xxxv​ This disparity is highly concerning, but not surprising, 
given that bankers and private business owners were constructed as the solution to our economic 
issues, while poor black men were described as prone to criminal behavior and lazy for not 
uplifting themselves from poverty. 
 With the Reagan administration igniting sufficient hysteria around the war on drugs, 
politicians that followed afterwards capitalized on associations between blackness and 
criminality for their campaign strategies or maintaining public support. Following the lead of 
Nixon and Reagan, George H.W. Bush released an ad right before the elections showing Willie 
Horton, a black man who was allegedly a rapist and murderer. He explained that his Democratic 
opponent, Michael Dukakis would allow people like him to have weekend release, while Bush 
would ensure that people like him were locked up. In July of that year, the New York Times was 
reporting on Dukakis’ gap widening between 7 and 10 points.​xxxvi​ The Willie Horton ad was 
released in late September, and evidently gained enough traction to appeal to white voters and 
went beyond closing to gap to lead to a “landslide victory” by Bush.​xxxvii​ With the ad being 
released a little over a month before the election, and Bush’s popularity increasing by about 30 
points in that time period, it’s clear that the ad made a significant impact. 
 With Michael Dukakis’ loss being largely attributed to his stance on crime, Democrats 
realized that they had to take harsher stances on crime if they were to win the election. With, 
both Democrats and Republicans taking increasingly punitive perspectives on crime, the way to 
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differentiate themselves was to take an even harsher stance on crime than those before them to 
gain a political advantage. Following Bush, Clinton increased police presence on the streets and 
militarized them, similar to the levels that we still see today. He also established many of the 
punitive laws that we still observe, including longer sentences, mandatory minimums, 3 strikes 
laws, and created 60 new capital punishments. Not to mention, he and his wife Hillary Clinton 
took advantage of the similar dog-whistle politics to garner public support, by famously referring 
to black male criminals specifically as “superpredators.”​xxxviii​ The result of this harmful rhetoric 
and expansion of the carceral state was higher police presence that mostly extended to poor 
communities of color, which led to higher rates of incarceration in these communities in nearly 
every crime. 
 With the war on terror largely occupying the presidential administrations of the early 21st 
century, mass incarceration hasn’t been at the center of discussions among politicians and 
presidential administrations. This means that the prison system looks largely like it has since the 
Clinton era, being extremely punitive and rampant with racial and class disparities. The majority 
of what has changed is the continued increase of for-profit prisons, and as a result, more big 
corporations with an investment in the prison industrial complex. Additionally, the housing crisis 
in 2008 led to cuts in many police department budgets. To regenerate revenue, police 
departments have responded by growing their responsibilities, extending the reach and gaze of 
the state. Wang lists over 20 new potential duties for police officers, suggested by “experts in the 
fields of city government, business, real estate, and entrepreneurship”, including responsibilities 
higher fees on constituents for infraction such as minor traffic violations, tripling the costs of 
getting a DUI, pay per call cost increase, or the police taking on new roles in communities, like 
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firearm safety classes, home checks, and monitoring of security cameras.​xxxix​ With the police 
taking on new surveillance role, it’s no surprise that we saw higher policing in poor black 
communities in Chicago in 2014 than we did during the stop-and-frisk era in New York. Likely 
as a result, we are also still seeing the same high rates of police brutality against black people as 
we’ve seen for many years.​xl 
In this section, I intended to prove that the association between blackness and criminality 
has a long history, which hopefully established the very deep rooted existence of the construction 
of black criminality, and demonstrated the ways in which science, anti-blackness, and 
neoliberalism have contributed to the image, which in recent years, has been sufficient reasoning 
to lock-up black people, especially black men. This historical tracing was necessary to 
understand the sections that follow it. Next, I will describe the risk assessment, which I believe is 
one of today’s manifestations of “black criminality”, as the test produces outcomes that show 
black people as being “higher risk” to society than other racial groups. I link blackness and risk 
together by describing how blackness is conflated with criminality, and how criminality leads to 
beliefs that that person is a “high risk” to society, justifying the need to incarcerate them. I will 
explain how there are particular ideological shifts happening now within mass incarceration that 
are reshaping ideas on who is a criminal, the majority of which we most aren’t aware of because 
they are largely invisible to the general public. 
Unpacking the risk assessment: conflating blackness with “high risk”  
This is the Texas Christian University Criminal Thinking Scale (TCU CTS) risk 
assessment that was used at a halfway house I used to intern at. When offenders moved into the 
house, this was one of the first documents they filled out. They filled in the bubbles on how 
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much they agree or disagree with the given statement. It was given to the social worker 
afterwards to score it. Even with the social worker’s involvement, this is still considered an 
actuarial assessment.  The risk assessment has 36 questions but decided to I include only the first 
two pages.​xli  
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This assessment is scored in a way where the higher score someone receives, the “higher risk” 
they are considered, from the perspective of the test designer. In this assessment, mostly giving 
strongly agree answers (and occasionally a strongly disagree response) will yield the highest risk 
scores. The questions above fall into 6 different categories of entitlement, justification, power 
orientation, cold heartedness, criminal rationalization, and personal irresponsibility.​xlii​ I’m most 
concerned with the last two factors, that make up a third of the assessment.​xliii​ In these sections, 
questions such as “the real reason you are locked up is because of your race”, “laws are just a 
way to keep poor people down”, and “you may be a criminal but your environment made you 
that way”, among others show the neoliberal belief that individuals, rather than larger social 
structures, should be held accountable for their crimes.​xliv​ Those that strongly agreed with the 
above statements (or those that took an anti-neoliberal stance that powerful institutions play the 
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largest role in incarceration) were labeled as “high risk”, and thus, more likely to reoffend. 
Furthermore, questions like “bankers, lawyers, and politicians get away with breaking the law 
every day”, “this country’s justice system was designed to treat everyone equally”, and “police 
do worse things than the ‘criminals’ they lock up” label offenders at a high risk of recidivism if 
they refute the myth of meritocracy and acknowledge the lack of fairness and inequality in our 
economic and political systems.​xlv​ Racial and class inequalities are, in fact, rampant in our 
economic and political systems, so those that point it out are only telling the harsh truth. 
It’s ironic that these truth tellers are labeled “high risk”. By telling the truth about 
inequality, to ​whom​ are they a risk to? What exactly are they ​putting at risk​? With the algorithms 
predicting black offenders and opposition to the neoliberal status quo as being “higher risk” to 
society and public safety, then it’s clear that there is an ideological foundation for the 
establishment of this risk assessment that intends to find these outcomes. First, because we know 
that it is within the capacity of scientists and statisticians to carefully curate a study to produce a 
certain outcome. Second, given that we know there is no racial group more prone to criminality, 
these results wouldn’t occur if the data had been collected fairly and interpreted accurately. The 
only reason it makes sense that we get these outcomes is due to how blackness has been socially 
constructed as more likely to commit a crime. 
 The example above has very clear links to my definitions of neoliberalism, 
anti-blackness, and scientific racism. However, in other risk assessments, some of the values are 
better concealed, but still yield the same results and show the same ideologies. Let’s take 
COMPAS as an example. The assessment is 8 pages long, so I chose the elements that were the 
most relevant to my analysis. This assessment doesn’t look at attitudes, but more personal and 
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social factors that the test designers believe could contribute to a person’s incarceration. This is 
an example of some of the questions ​asked​. ​xlvi 
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By looking at these factors on the surface, it may not seem like anything was wrong. It 
might even seem quite comprehensive. The major issue with this assessment is that only the test 
designers know what is arguably the most crucial part of determining pretrial, sentencing, and 
parole decisions: the weight of each factor in determining outcomes.​xlvii​ The weight of each 
factor shows us how much value private companies are placing on certain factors, and without 
this knowledge, we can’t know exactly how risk is being determined. However, if ProPublica’s 
findings show us that risk assessments have the tendency to conflate blackness with risk, then 
that likely implies that risk assessments creators often are not putting emphasis in the right areas. 
Additionally, this particular risk assessment relies on current charges, run-ins with the 
police/prior charges, family and friend criminal history (among other elements), many of which 
would not be asked in court to determine sentencing. Even if court procedures aren’t full proof, 
they go further than the risk assessment does at asking about situational and contextual factors 
that certainly explain the nature of the potential crime better than run-ins with the police (given 
that run-ins with the police are frequent in highly patrolled neighborhoods) or a friend’s criminal 
history.​xlviii​ Even these questions are racialized, as it is much more likely that a black or brown 
convict would have more friends and family with run-ins with the police, effectively increasing 
their risk score, whether or not it actually increases their apparent “risk” to society. This shows 
that COMPAS and many other risk assessments like it are not only an ineffective tool in 
measuring recidivism, but they also end up reinforcing racial hierarchies in the name of public 
safety. Further, they divert responsibility from test designers and governments that have 
established a social context where racist conclusions in science can occur, through claiming the 
results come from the algorithm, not the humans that designed it. 
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Additionally, we should be concerned about the notion of prevention (the very purpose of 
risk assessments) in social science research. Robert Castel explains in “From Dangerousness to 
Risk” that “prevention” in social science, historically “claims to ​construct​ the objective 
conditions of emergence of danger, so as then to ​deduce​ from them the new modalities of 
intervention”, with nearly every combination of factors yielding some sort of indication that the 
person is a “risk.”​xliv​ He goes on to argue that when one has both the means and the motivation to 
create a full-fledged preventative policy, then someone had to be assigned as “dangerous” from 
the beginning, given that someone’s potential “dangerousness” can only be proven after the 
undesirable behavior occurs.​l 
So, to return to the questions I proposed earlier and to take them a step further; what is 
actually be gained by taking these types of “preventative measures”? Who is benefitting from 
them and what are they being prevented from? Also, to whom and to what are offenders “high 
risk” to? They are a ​high​ ​risk to a racial and class hierarchy​ that intends to subjugate and silence 
those who speak out against it.  We know this is true because both COMPAS and the TCU CTS 
proved that being “high risk” is often highly correlated with being black and in opposition to an 
unequal and unfair status quo, and a high risk score is sufficient justification for many judges to 
lock this person away. 
Algorithmic Power as the new 21st century soft power 
Racialized scientific studies associating blackness and criminality emerged during the 
1890s and early 1900s as mentioned previously, but this is a problem today too, as risk 
assessments have emerged as an example of a modern day resurgence of scientific racism. 
Nonetheless, risk assessments provide an example of a new form of scientific power unlike 
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anything that we have ever seen before. Shoshana Zuboff, author of ​The Age​ ​of Surveillance 
Capitalism​, describes that for the first time ever, we are objectifying the private human 
experience, calling it behavioral data, buying and selling it, and utilizing it to predict current and 
future behaviors. 
She explains that it began in 2001 with Google, who started collecting data on their users 
in order to improve the search engine. Google ended up collecting more data than they originally 
needed that they thought would go to waste. They decided to take this otherwise digital waste 
and combine it with their strong computational abilities to predict future behaviors of their users. 
Soon, they had gathered so much information, that they didn’t even need consent from 
consumers anymore. They were able to use previous information to make inferences about 
consumer behaviors in order to control what they would buy, or what ads they would click on, 
for example. Eventually, they had enough data that they had developed methods to surveil users 
and consumers all over the internet.​li​ This has come to be known as predictive analytics. Other 
private companies began capitalizing on this quickly when they realized the new capacity to 
essentially control the future, including companies with stakes in the prison industrial complex. 
In the context of mass incarceration, this ability to predict, and thus, control the future, 
has the potential to be incredibly dangerous. ​Walter Perry et. al describes this dynamic in their 
book Predictive Policing: The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations, 
writing, “The underlying assumption -- and prediction -- is that crime will likely occur where 
crime has already occurred: The past is prologue.”​lii​ He goes on to explain the key issue with 
using any data of the past: “They [racial proxies] can bolster algorithmic accuracy, but only at 
the cost of validating and perpetuating the vicious cycle in which our justice system’s propensity 
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to disproportionately arrest and incarcerate black people fuels the disproportionate arrest and 
incarceration of black people.”​liii​ In other words, by using old, flawed data (like COMPAS used) 
a feedback loop is being created where the more data that operates under these same racial 
assumptions, the more conclusions will be drawn that black offenders are “higher risk” than 
white offenders, providing greater reason to maintain the same disproportionate numbers of 
black men in prisons. 
 In effect, scientists and test designers have been conflating blackness with risk, and have 
attempted to prove it for centuries under this myth of scientific objectivity and neoliberal values 
of individual accountability and the myth of meritocracy. In recent years, the addition of 
predictive analytics and its capacity to shape future outcomes has created additional 
reinforcement for the proliferation of the image of the “black criminal” with its ability to shape 
future demographics in prisons. 
Through current dominant beliefs on scientific objectivity and the use of algorithms, 
accountability on test designers and 
private companies is largely removed, 
even while the impact is still the same. 
Police are monitoring the same 
neighborhoods as they did before, and risk 
assessments are proving the same 
outcomes as scientific studies linking 
blackness and criminality have for over a 
century.​liv​ The only difference is that in 
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the past, their approach was based on intuition, and now they have an evidence-based approach 
backing up their previous conclusions, thwarting blame from themselves. In many ways, this is 
actually worse than before because it’s not removing the forms of hard power (i.e. overpolicing 
communities of color), but simply adding on a new form of soft power, that is largely invisible to 
the general public. This makes it hard for black communities to get justice when all 
accountability has been stripped from test designers and key aspects of the algorithms are 
concealed from the general public. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have traced the image of the “black criminal” throughout history and 
explained how it has looked different over time, but with the same beliefs and goals in mind. 
Then, I explained that the association between blackness and criminality today comes in the form 
of the risk assessment, where black people (especially black men) are labeled as “high risk” more 
than any other racial group. I explain how this image is able to be upheld today due to neoliberal 
values, scientific racism, and the mass incarceration system. Finally, I explain how when these 
systems intersect, the conflation of blackness with risk looks different than it ever has, where 
algorithms are controlling current and future racial demographics in prisons. 
 As the obsession with big data is growing globally, I don’t see the end of risk 
assessments in sight, so with that in mind, I want to consider what fairness and justice could look 
like in the era of big data. If risk assessment algorithms are to exist, we need to start 
reconsidering what questions we are asking, and looking at the data in multiple ways before 
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conclusions are drawn. For example, if someone is looking at the impact of crime on 
communities, most people look at victims of the crime, which shows the locations of where 
crime is occurring. However, Laura Kurgan of the Columbia Center for Spatial Research asked a 
different question that led to more useful results. Rather than looking at where crimes were 
occurring, she looked at who is being criminalized, by looking at the percentages of residents in 
each neighborhood in New York City who were incarcerated. Her study found that 11 million 
dollars was invested in arresting and incarcerating people only living in 11 blocks in 
Brownsville, Brooklyn. Other researchers looking at the same data but asked different questions 
about where crime was happening, and likely would have concluded that the problem lies in 
Manhattan. A closer look shows us that this neighborhood is poor and in need of better resources 
and infrastructure to sustain themselves, implying that any criminal activity happening was 
probably occurring so that they could meet basic needs.​lv 
To apply this to risk assessments, perhaps rather than asking questions that 
disproportionately label black people as “high risk”, test designers could (and should) consider 
questions about ​who​ and ​what ​is putting them ​at risk​ for incarceration. They should be asking 
questions like; what structures are in place and what factors are influencing racial disparities in 
incarceration? What social services could be in place to both disrupt these disparities, and 
decrease overall numbers in prisons? Of course, in a neoliberal era where social services are 
being slashed and accountability is shifted to the individual, these types of questions aren’t being 
asked enough, but would give much more useful results in understanding mass incarceration in 
the United States. 
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 We also need to fully deconstruct the idea that black people, especially black men, are 
more prone to criminal behavior. As this essay has shown, this association between blackness 
and criminality has made its way into politics, science, economics, statistics, and more, meaning 
all areas involved will need to be deliberate in deconstructing this representation. Some ways 
that this can be possible is by having greater representation of black people in power. More 
specific to mass incarceration, there need to be general decarceration strategies that intend to 
decrease numbers in prisons and the scope of the prison industrial complex. There also needs to 
be tactics that respond to racial disparities alone, such as decreasing police presence in 
communities of color and reforming algorithms by collecting new, accurate data that asks 
questions about how and why racial disparities are occurring, rather than reproducing them. 
 Test designers also need to be designing against the occurrence of bias. In particular, we 
need to be thoughtful about the instances in which race is seen as a variable at all. Zuberi 
explains that “racial data are essential if we are to achieve racial equality; however this does not 
mean that every statistic should be presented racially. In fact, much that is presented as racial 
statistics has only helped aggravate the problem of racial conflict by making it appear that race 
causes people to behave or respond in particular ways.”​lvi​ He goes on to explain that race itself 
cannot be a variable. Claiming race as a variable operates under the assumption that there is a 
biological difference in how certain races behave, when in fact, it’s how we socially construct 
race that determines racial stratification, rather than inherent differences. He argues against race 
as a cause by writing, “causes are only things that can, in theory, be manipulated or altered. This 
recognition forces us to consider the ability to vary of the individuals or units we study” and that 
race can’t fall into the category of a cause because “[in] research on intelligence [for example], 
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one cannot be more or less of one race; such a notion is impossible to measure, because race is 
thought to be an unalterable characteristic.”​lvii​ Thus, race as a cause can’t be used to measure any 
outcome because it is an independent variable that can’t be manipulated. This also means that we 
can’t use a proxy for race either, as the variable in its replacement is normally strongly correlated 
with race. Rather than asking if race is the cause, they social scientists can study whether or not 
racial ​attitudes and prejudice​ are the causes. Attitudes and prejudice can be measured as a way to 
determine is discrimination is occuring. 
 As I’ve mentioned the solutions outlined above are potential improvements to racialized 
algorithms in risk assessments, as I am operating under the assumption that they won’t be going 
away any time soon. However, after providing historical context about scientific and 
mathematical studies deliberately being constructed to yield the results of white supremacy and 
“black inferiority”, I would be naive to believe that reforming the risk assessments is truly the 
answer in understanding recidivism (especially when we know that many risk assessments don’t 
assess what they claim to assess). History behind the risk assessments can’t be erased or 
removed. 
 Further, the 21st century introduction of predictive analytics creates a dangerous 
feedback loop, where the original data was skewed, but produced the intended outcomes, so 
more data is gathered to support the originally skewed data, which effectively bolsters the 
permanence of the false, racialized conclusion. This is the element that proves to me that no 
benefits of risk assessments will outweigh their costs, unless we start collecting data from 
scratch, and gathering it in the way that we should have been all along.  
Olivia Sailors (she/her/hers) is a graduating senior at Macalester College from Newton, KS. She 
will be graduating with a double major in American Studies and Educational Studies. She is 
most interested in reforming discipline and curriculum in schools to produce more equal and 
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